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In February, Baroness Newlove, the Victims’ Commissioner, published a review into whether 
child victims are receiving their respective entitlements as guaranteed in the Victims Code, 
and Special Measures Directions. More importantly, it investigated whether the legal system 
properly treats children with dignity, respect, belief, and takes their complaints seriously, 
despite, or because of, their young age – themes that this paper will reflect on from a 
historical perspective. Newlove was ‘disgusted to discover’ that young victims were still not 
being taken sufficiently seriously by criminal justice agencies, social workers, teachers and 
society as a whole. Some were ‘made to feel like criminals’ or had been ‘accused of wasting 
police time’, many had lost faith in the criminal justice system because of their treatment, 
especially where there was no subsequent conviction. Despite similar criticisms in the Savile 
and Rotherham reports, Newlove concluded that ‘lessons are still not being learnt’ about 
taking children’s accounts seriously.  
 
We have been here so many times before - for me personally, since I started my dissertation 
in 1987 and then PhD reviewing the 1989 Pigot Report. Later with debates over the YJCE 
Act 1999. More recently the NSPCC’s 2004 Report ‘In Their Own Words’1 followed by 
Measuring Up 2007-2008, showed that the implementation of mechanisms designed to 
assist children from initial disclosure to subsequent court trial were still far from 
systematically or automatically provided.2 This led to a plethora of responses including 
Achieving Best Evidence, Witness Care Units, the Witness Charter etc etc. Even so, in 2014 
HMIC found that the specific needs of the child were taken into account in only 10 of 69 
interviews surveyed, video recorded evidence was poor, inappropriate questioning 
techniques were used, interview rooms were not suitable and better training was required. 
 
It seems futile to keep asking why the same recommendations are continually reiterated, but 
never effectively executed. The Ministry of Justice insists that “children are only required to 
give evidence in court when absolutely necessary in the interests of justice and there is no 
Art 8 privacy violation’ – but this still accounts for over 40,000 child witnesses a year. Are 
they really all absolutely necessary? It is probably equally futile to ask why the test for civil 
proceedings, confirmed by the Supreme Court in W 2010, is not applied to criminal 
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proceedings: ‘When considering whether a child should be called as a witness, the court 
must weigh two considerations: the advantages that that will bring to the determination of the 
truth and the damage it may do to the welfare of this or any child’:3 
 
Pigot stressed that “most children are disturbed to a greater or lesser extent by giving 
evidence in court” but there has been no scientific evaluation of this. Historically, there has 
been a real reluctance to acknowledge the psychological and physical stress of vulnerable 
victims from the intimidating court atmosphere, trial delays, age-inappropriate questioning, 
cross-examination, refusal to allow pre-trial counselling and presence of intermediaries etc. 
In 2014, the retiring Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, reflecting on his experiences in the 
criminal courts, argued that child witnesses should not have to physically attend and give 
evidence in court. The refusal to ease the experience of child witnesses for nearly two 
decades since section 28 YJCE Act was enacted in 1999 to permit pre-recorded cross-
examinations is incomprehensible given the traumatic testimony many – thousands? -have 
experienced. Such criticism is vindicated by the success of the pilot project and 
announcement this week to extend the concession to adult rape complainants.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of Justice’s evaluation concluded that the pilot schem had 
enabled a more positive experience for vulnerable victims: reducing waiting times, producing 
more focused questioning and was, overall, less traumatic. However, it was immediately 
challenged. In Re RL 2015, the trial judge pruned some of the questions submitted by 
defence counsel on the basis they were unnecessary and repetitious.4 The defendant 
appealed, claiming he had been prevented from asking those questions and forced to rely on 
the ‘combined effect’ of being compelled to put ‘bald propositions’ and accept the answer 
given. He claimed the judge’s rulings were ‘draconian’ and that his cross-examination of the 
children had been ‘emasculated’ though could not point to any particular question which he 
had been unable to ask. The appeal was rejected.  
 
Such defence claims and tactics are objectionable reflecting a long history of negative 
attitudes and insensitivities from some lawyers and members of the judiciary towards child 
complainants, and an inherent reluctance from both the legislature and the judiciary to 
acknowledge their particular vulnerability. So why has the law and its representatives failed 
to respect the dignity of child witnesses and accept and believe what they say, and on what 
grounds - social, moral, gender, religious - have they ‘justified’ - or attempted to justify – 
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such aversion? As we all know, more than any other criminal offence, complaints of sexual 
violation are intrinsically engaged with ‘the truth’. But, from a historiographic perspective, too 
many judicial directions have tended to be dismissive of the authenticity of the truth, 
adopting an exclusive approach to competency and fixating on the legal minutiae of giving 
evidence, rather than encouraging a more inclusive one as in many inquisitorial jurisdictions. 
As Children’s Minister, Tim Loughton confirmed in 2011 that “Sexual exploitation has not 
been fully understood by the judiciary and the justice system…even if children do get over 
the huge hurdle and want to bring their abuser to justice, they then have to face a judicial 
process which sometimes treats them as though they were somehow complicit in their 
abuse.”5.  
 
This has produced considerable inconsistency in the application of the law in practice, 
oscillating, through judicial discretion, between the imposition of exacting rules of evidence 
to more positive acceptance and facilitation of infant testimony. Yet even a more apparently 
inclusive approach can still be compromised by the unconscious invocation of moral and 
gendered norms that may reprise historical echoes but can also be perceived as distorting 
the law’s primary objective of protection.  
 
Contemporary concerns 
Before we delve into the past, it is worth considering a couple of recent examples to set the 
contemporary context and illustrate some of the criticisms raised. Two years ago a gang of 
five men and a teenager, all of African origin, were convicted of rape and sexual activity with 
six girls aged 13 and over whom they had groomed and subjected to regular sexual abuse 
committed in cars, houses, parks and woods. Michael Magarian QC suggested that the 
complainants could have been ‘brainwashed by social workers’ and said ‘It’s better to be a 
victim than a slag. Once you are a victim who has been groomed you no longer have to take 
responsibility for anything that you did.’ His co-counsel, Clare Dowse, claimed that they 
‘might be enjoying all the attention from police and social services.’6 Given the 
contemporaneous investigations of CSE nationwide such comments were highly ill-
considered and unprofessional. Critics, including [Jon Brown] the NSPCC, condemned the 
statements as inappropriate and demonstrating a complete lack of understanding about how 
children are groomed reflecting similar prevailing attitudes of the police and social services 
as exemplified in the Rotherham inquiry – still ongoing and still revealing unacceptable 
professional conduct.7 In my view, even this was an overly generous excusal as Magarian 
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was deliberately drawing on enduring moral and gendered norms to try and shift 
responsibility from his client to the complainants. 
 
Such comments are not dissimilar to those of Lord Justice Moses at the Court of Appeal in a 
similar case [without the grooming] R v C8, involving six young male adult footballers 
charged with the statutory rape of two 12 year-old girls, one of whom had ‘agreed’ to have 
oral sex with all five. Halving their sentences, so they could be released immediately, Moses 
concluded: “The girls wanted to have sex and they had pretty miserable, fleeting, sex in a 
freezing cold park. It is what young people do, but they are not allowed to do it until they are 
16. The law is there to protect them.” As I have previously commented,9 some aspects of his 
judgment are questionable, resonating with ill-considered judicial stereotypifications from the 
past relating to a female complainant’s dress, conduct and previous sexual experience. 
While Moses’ remarks may be excused as unintentional they still unconsciously inflect 
judicial perspectives undermining the dignity of child witnesses and implying that young 
teens really do know what they are doing when they consent to oral sex with multiple 
partners. I do wonder whether he would think the same if it was his own daughter?   
 
To further complicate the issue, this week at the Scottish High Court, Lady Maggie Scott 
granted an absolute discharge to a then 19 year-old student for statutory rape as the girl had 
‘willingly participated’, showed ‘no concerns and there was no suggestion of her being 
distressed.10 Maybe one for discussion later? 
 
Being Believed 
Historically, children have often been regarded as neither reliable nor competent witnesses. 
This is hardly surprising as the law required child witnesses to give their evidence from 
absolute memory and, until 1987, in the direct physical presence of the accused. Glanville 
Williams thought children made unreliable witnesses as they are ‘suggestible’ ‘egocentric’, 
only ‘slowly learn the duty of speaking the truth’ and that instances were reported where 
‘little girls’ were not only willing partners in vice’ but ‘might spite or blackmail to get innocent 
men in trouble’.11  
 
Judicial opinion was initially guided by the great legal jurists of the day. Coke was one of the 
first to assert that all witnesses were obliged to swear an oath to God, thus infants 
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unequivocally lacked capacity unless they could demonstrate sufficient understanding of the 
likely implications of ‘burning in hell’ if they lied. 12 This needs to be contextualised within the 
prevailing moral values which encouraged a belief in the innate ‘viciousness’ of children – 
especially girls – who had not been consciously ‘saved’ – or ‘born again’ – an ‘experience’ 
supposed to occur between 4 and 6 years of age when a child’s pious sensibilities were 
thought to be first aroused.13  
 
Blackstone was more empathetic believing infants should be heard as ‘their inexperience 
and artlessness’ limited any motive for falsehood and lies. Hale advanced a more subjective 
approach that infants under 14 should not be examined on oath but thought a girl under 12 
who had been raped could give evidence ‘If she has the sense and understanding that she 
knows and considers the obligations of the oath she may be sworn.’ This was confirmed by 
the 12 justices at Sergeants Inn Hall in the lead case of Brasier 1779 - that an infant under 7 
may be sworn provided she is sufficiently mature and could answer questions that would test 
her understanding of piety. Most witnesses were under 12 in line with the law relating to 
carnal knowledge outside marriage and the age of protection which [dropped to 10 in 1861, 
increased to 13 1875] increased to 16 under the CLAA 1885.  
 
The law further required, as a matter of practice, that the testimony of anyone alleging a 
sexual offence be corroborated by independent evidence. Capital convictions could stand on 
a child’s testimony but were rare as judges were reluctant to allow children to give sworn 
testimony. One example is H. Smith, sentenced to death at Salisbury Assizes for raping 6 
year old Ann Fleck. Her testimony was corroborated by the fact he had just been released 
from serving 18 months for a similar offence and a second bill involving a 13 year old girl had 
also been presented to the court.14  
 
So crucial was religious belief that judges were prepared to postpone trials until the next 
Assizes so that adult witnesses who had heard of God but never learned the catechism 
could be instructed in such matters.15 Examples soon start to appear of children being 
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‘educated’ and given ‘crash courses’ in their God-fearing responsibilities before testifying: 
after all God would always know if a child told a lie: ‘Thou god Sees’t me’. 16 The earliest 
example I have come across is the rape of a 7 year-old in 1795 where the trial was 
postponed until she had been instructed by a clergyman on the principles of her ‘duty’.17 By 
the 1830s, access to Sunday Schools18 meant that regardless of class, parents could be 
justifiably castigated by the court if their daughters were found ignorant of their duty and the 
case collapsed as a result. 
 
However, the judiciary were becoming increasingly sceptical of such tactics.19 At the Central 
Criminal Court, Baron Alderson refused to examine a 12 year-old girl on oath who alleged 
she had been sexually assaulted by her father.20 Despite attending church intermittently she 
‘had never heard of God, and knew nothing of the existence of an Almighty Creator.’ 
Alderson rejected the prosecution request that the girl be instructed asserting that the judges 
were all agreed that it was an ‘incorrect proceeding’ like ‘preparing or getting up a witness for 
a particular purpose’. He also opined that ‘It was really dreadful to find a child 12 years old 
was not even aware of the existence of God.’ Thus she was doubly abused by her father – 
sexually and for failing to ensure she was a good Christian girl and so could not be believed.  
The jury inevitably returned a verdict of not guilty. 
 
At Durham Assizes in 1849, Justice Patterson rejected a conviction for carnal knowledge of 
a 10 year old girl believing she was too young to be sworn. There was no evidence she had 
resisted or refused consent though medical testimony confirmed marks of violence could 
have been caused by an implement or finger. Patterson reinforced the stereotype stressing 
‘My experience has shown me that children of a very tender age have vicious propensities’.21 
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The judiciary therefore retained mixed views on whether the oath made any difference. In 
Holmes 1861 the trial judge was persuaded that a 6 year old girl could give sworn evidence 
but questioned whether ‘it really advances the credibility of testimony to such questions.’22  
While the requirement of religious understanding remained, two tropes begin to stand out in 
the case reports: the prosecution start to emphasise the relative ‘intelligence’ of the child 
often coupled with her ‘looking pretty’ and the extent to which her testimony ‘could be 
shaken’ – i.e.good looking girls appear more virginal and are inherently more believable . 
Naturally, children were expected to be innocent and lacking in sexually knowledge: ‘a child 
cannot consent to what it does not know the nature of’. A double-edged sword as neither 
should she possess the vocabulary to articulate it so automatically her testimony became 
unbelievable.23  
 
In 1885 Shaftesbury challenged the Government to relax the rule that children under 12 
must give sworn evidence arguing, like Blackstone, that young children should be more 
trusted than adults to tell the truth – [something that would not be achieved for another 100 
years]. Scottish law had allowed children to give unsworn evidence for years such as R v 
Millar 1870 where the defendant was convicted on the evidence of a girl aged 3 ½ years.24 
He secured an amendment to the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 which permitted girls 
only under 13 years to give unsworn evidence in cases of defilement, but the infamous 
proviso (eventually removed by section 34 Criminal Justice Act 1988) was added that the 
accused could not be convicted as a matter of law unless it was corroborated by other 
material evidence implicating him. The amendment immediately increased the number of 
successful prosecutions.25 It was later consolidated in the Children and Young Persons Act 
1933 allowing all children under 14 to give unsworn evidence where they possessed 
sufficient intelligence and understood the duty to tell the truth, and now section 52 Criminal 
Justice Act 1991. But some elements of the judiciary persisted in trying to impose a 
minimum age bar preferring an objective rather than a subjective approach. LCJ Goddard 
settled the position in Wallwork 1958 involving a 5 year old victim of incest who could not 
remember anything about the abuse. Goddard stated it was most undesirable to call a child 
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that age and hoped it would not happen again, mindful of his assertion the judiciary adopted 
the rule that the minimum age of competency should be 8 years.26  
 
Pigot was highly critical of the judicial bar arguing it had led to the ‘abandonment of 
prosecutions for a large number of sexual offences against children’. In 1988 Judge Willcock 
QC at Exeter Crown Court ordered the jury to dismiss charges of indecent assault as it 
would be a ‘waste of time’ to ask two girls aged 10 and 7 to hold the New testament and take 
the oath.27 He told the jury ‘You may think this is a curious quirk of our law, but it is for good, 
logical and historical reasons. We are powerless to overcome it.’ In 1989 Judge Joanne 
Bracewell acquitted a man of sexually abusing a 6 year old girl aged 7 at the time of the trial 
stating she was ‘troubled by the tender age of the witness.’28 Post-Pigot, in 1990, Wallwork 
was approved by the Court of Appeal (LJ Ognall) in Wright & Ormerod,29 but was quickly 
overruled by the Criminal Justice Act 1991 enabling all children under 14 to give unsworn 
evidence.  
 
Any pretence of an age bar was finally dispensed with when Lord Judge rejected the appeal 
from Steven Barker, in the Baby P related case, approving the trial judge’s decision that the 
4 ½ year old girl he had anally abused when she was 2, was competent to give evidence. The LCJ 
declared age is not determinative of a child’s ability to give truthful and accurate evidence; C 
was a compelling and competent witness.30 The ruling was highly significant in light of the 
NSPCC’s 2008-9 survey of over 21,000 child sex crimes findings that 1 in 7 victims are 
under 10 and over 1,000 were under 5 years. 
 
Dignity and Respect 
Aside from believability, there are abundant examples of the humiliation and embarrassment 
child witnesses have suffered in recounting their experience numerous times or reproached 
for promiscuous or seductive conduct. One of the most extreme I have come across is 
Eugenie Plummer, 11 years, from a wealthy and highly respectable family who, together with 
her 8 year old sister Stephanie, testified against their in-house tutor the Reverend Edward 
Hatch, a 42 year old married man educated at Eton and Cambridge. Their father prosecuted 
Hatch for a number of counts of indecent assault alleged to have been committed in 
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carriages and the girls’ bedroom. Both girls gave evidence on oath supported by other family 
witnesses but there were inconsistencies in their parents’ testimonies about how frequently 
the girls attended church. Hatch was found guilty and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment at 
Newgate Gaol, destroying his reputation. With no right of criminal appeal he sought a pardon 
from the Secretary of State. This was refused so in May 1860 he prosecuted Eugenie for 
wilful and corrupt perjury as he had been convicted partly on the testimony she gave on 
oath. The trial lasted four days. Unusually, as the accused, Eugenie was allowed to sit at the 
table with her defence counsel [Edwin James QC] rather than in the dock.31 In his 8 hours 
summing up, Baron Channel emphasised the discrepancies about how often the girls went 
to church. After two hours deliberation the jury returned a verdict of guilty recommending the 
need for strict moral and religious education for Eugenie who was sentenced to 3 weeks in 
Holloway followed by 2 years in a reformatory school.32 
 
With no state prosecutor, prosecutions were typically instigated by a child’s family, herself a 
or voluntary society in association with the police. After initial disclosure, complainants would 
be expected to repeat their account to police officers, surgeon, magistrates in committal 
proceedings and the judge at trial. They might also be required to confront the accused and 
state the charge in his presence. In 1900 at North Fulham Police Station, Jessie Quantrell, 
under 13, alleged she had been criminally assaulted by Benjamin Dent a gentleman, who 
denied the offence. After a medical examination supported her account the police required 
her to state the charge in his direct presence.  
 
The oppressive dominance of the all male criminal justice establishment cannot be 
underestimated. Statements were taken by male officers, it was not until 1914 that two 
deputations representing the National Vigilance Association and the Criminal Law 
Amendment Committee pressed the Home Office to appoint women police to take 
depositions from women and children in all cases involving immorality.33 This led to the 
recruitment of the first Metropolitan female officers. It took much longer to populate other 
forces though Plymouth’s chief constable had introduced a female special constable to take 
such statements in 1912. 
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Courtrooms were overwhelmingly masculine spaces in structure and personnel. Children 
were physically isolated in the witness box. In the early twentieth century many courts would 
exclude all women and boys or imply that ‘no decent women’ remained depriving victims of 
the support and presence of other women and shifting sympathy towards the accused.34 
Those in positions of authority - the historical equivalents of Savile, Harris and Lord Janner -
could convince magistrates, juries and others that they did not commit the offences alleged 
because their status outranked a child’s believability – the respectability imperative. 
Example: John Hughes, 44, a former Presbyterian minister now General secretary of the 
Gladstone league, was indicted for the carnal knowledge of 6 year old Edna Houghton, 
found by her mother in Hughes’ bed with him partially undressed. Edna’s 10 year old sister 
confirmed Hughes had entered their shared bedroom and taken Edna from her bed. Hughes 
claimed she must have sleep walked and ‘accidentally’ wandered into his bedroom while he 
was on the lavatory as he never even noticed her in his room. Hughes had also been Private 
Secretary to Lord Burghclere who travelled from the South of France to testify that he was a 
man of ‘good morals, high principles and great intelligence’ – who would believe a child over 
a peer? The jury found him not guilty. 35  
 
In 1918 Captain Eliot Crawshay-Williams, 39 and a former MP for Leicester appeared at 
Leeds Assizes accused of attempt rape on his landlady’s 10 year old daughter while she 
was out. The child’s story was corroborated by the doctor. In cross-examination she said she 
had previously sat on the accused’s foot playing ‘ride a cock horse’ and that he often kissed 
her. Williams had offered money to her mother to withdraw the complaint which she refused. 
He claimed he had not ‘tampered with the child’ but ‘I kissed and fondled and made love to 
her. Believe me I did nothing wrong.’36 Committed to trial he was found not guilty by the 
magistrates who believed his defence that ‘the girl’s story was pure imagination.’37 
 
It is impossible to track how many child abusers have escaped justice over the years or won 
appeals because of inconsistent legal rules and conscious and unconscious bias in judicial 
direction. Judges, like Pigot, who have been sensitive to the needs of children have often 
found resulting guilty verdicts challenged or overturned on the grounds of prejudice to the 
accused. In Dunne, 1929, the judge interviewed a 7 year-old incest victim out of court to 
determine if she was competent to give sworn evidence, he concluded she was but her 
abuser won his appeal against conviction as it was held the examination was unlawful.38 The 
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competency of a 5 year old also led to a conviction being quashed in Southern a year later 
as the preliminary inquiry had not taken place in the presence of the jury.39 Nearly 100 years 
ago in 1925, the Committee on Sexual Offences Against Young Persons found that of 286 
prosecutions for carnal knowledge of girls under 13, 30 were discharged by the magistrates, 
12 tried summarily acquitted and 20 acquitted at the Assizes – over 20%.40 Reasons given 
included difficulties in conducting and proving cases, the strain on child witnesses in re-
telling their story, embarrassment, distress and the proximity of the accused. The 
implementation of section 28 has finally mitigated some of this pressure but with current 
research suggesting that only 2-3% of adults make false allegations of rape there is no 
reason to think that children are any more likely to tell such lies despite what the masculine 
establishments of the church and law might have said in the past.41  
 
Conclusion 
What to say? Over the last 20 years the restrictive legal rules in respect of competency, 
corroboration and the physical delivery of testimony have gradually been chipped away and 
revised, and with the implementation of section 28 the final evidential obstacle has been 
removed. History has shown that facilitating the delivery of children’s evidence has facilitated 
an equivalent increase in convictions without undermining the integrity of the legal system or 
creating wrongful convictions – this is not rocket science! Historically, there has been much 
uncertainty in the criminal justice system about how the evidence of children should be 
received and perceived, often clouded by misunderstandings about the existence and truth 
of child sexual exploitation. Attempts to impose uniformity, albeit in the interests of 
protection, have tended to treat child witnesses as legal objects, not subjects, questioning 
their believability and undermining their dignity and respect.  
 
Finally, for some points to ponder re historic abuse cases and child witnesses generally I 
would refer you to Oliver Saxby QC’s blog at Pump Court which identifies some of the key 
challenges in prosecuting and defending historic cases. While I would not wish to denigrate 
his professionalism and expertise I cannot help but think that while ever we have an 
adversarial legal system where barristers can defend one day and prosecute another there 
is an inevitable conflict that must operate against the interests of child victims. 
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